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RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9950
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2821
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4232
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9995
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001865

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: UML GENERAL SECRETARY CONCERNED ABOUT WAY FORWARD

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1576

[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 1664

[1](#)C. KATHMANDU 1806

[1](#)D. KATHMANDU 1799

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (C) During a July 12 meeting, CPN-UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal told CDA he was worried about the way forward in the peace process. MK Nepal lamented the ground already lost to the Maoists in the eight-point agreement (ref A). He stressed the importance of achieving a consensus within the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) on how to deal with the management of Maoist weapons before Parliament could be dissolved and a new interim government formed. He stated categorically that Maoists could not enter the government before giving up their arms (ref B). While suspicious that the Maoists might be trying to dissolve Parliament to take control of the country, he remained optimistic that, in time, the Maoists could become a democratic mainstream party. MK Nepal noted the need for the Government of Nepal (GON) to bring the Nepal Army under its full control. He welcomed election monitoring support which he claimed had been offered by the Carter Center. End Summary.

SPA UNITY NEEDED TO CHECK MAOISTS

[1](#)2. (C) The CDA stressed to MK Nepal the need for unity within the SPA to check the Maoists, noting that the Maoists were skilled tacticians and have been intensively meeting individual SPA leaders. MK Nepal emphasized the CPN-UML's commitment to SPA cohesion. He said that, by the end of the day on July 12, the CPN-UML would have met with all SPA Parties except for the Nepal Sadbhavana Party and People's Front Nepal (PFN), which he dismissed as "mostly Maoists." He stressed that the Parties needed to come to a common understanding on dealing with the Maoists on weapons management. He added that a balance of power among the Maoists, Nepali Congress (NC), and CPN-UML is key to achieving peace. He said that during a meeting earlier in the day with Maoists, he told the Maoists that if they were committed to multi-party democracy then the country would have it. He underlined that the GON must win the support of

the Nepali people and the international community, because the people of Nepal would decide the fate of the Parties. MK Nepal urged the international community to support the mainstream political parties.

WEAPONS MANAGEMENT AND DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT SHOULD GO HAND IN HAND

13. (C) MK Nepal focused discussion on the issues of weapons management and the dissolution of Parliament. He lamented that PM Koirala had hastily signed the eight-point agreement without consulting the CPN-UML or other members of the SPA and stressed that the current challenge was how to effect "damage control" to find a proper way to move forward with the peace process. MK Nepal categorically stated that there could be no Maoists in the government until arms management had been resolved. He commented, however, that because the eight-point agreement was unclear, there was confusion about what weapons management meant. He opined that the GON must develop a clear roadmap and timeline for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Maoists before a new interim government was formed and Parliament was dissolved.

14. (C) While MK Nepal acknowledged that he was suspicious that the Maoists were planning to dissolve Parliament so they could take control of the country, he also expressed optimism that the Maoists would ultimately give up their weapons and join the political mainstream. CDA pressed MK Nepal, asking what Maoist actions had led him to believe they would disarm. MK Nepal replied that he was not "fully confident," but thought events would move in a positive direction resulting in Maoists giving up arms. He added that it would "take time" for the Maoists to transform into a democratic party. Regarding recent Maoist statements about not giving up arms (ref C), he complained that no one from the SPA had questioned Maoist leaders on their remarks. He added that the GON continued to give Maoists all they wanted in peace negotiations.

CONCERNED ABOUT ARMY'S LOYALTY

15. (C) The CPN-UML General Secretary told CDA that the Parties were worried about the Maoists on the extreme left and the Nepal Army (NA) and King on the extreme right. In clear reference to the potential for an army coup, he lamented that the GON had only made cosmetic changes to the NA and had yet to bring the NA fully under the control of the GON. MK Nepal suggested that the GON needed a Defense Minister, because PM Koirala, though formally Defense Minister, had no time to fulfill these responsibilities. MK Nepal noted that the proper role of the NA is to defend the country -- under the civilian control of the GON -- from the Maoist threat.

UML WOULD SUPPORT CARTER CENTER ELECTION MONITORING

16. (C) MK Nepal mentioned that he had recently met with representatives of the Carter Center whom he claimed had expressed willingness to monitor constituent assembly elections. He told CDA that the CPN-UML could support Carter Center monitoring, and slightly less enthusiastically added that the CPN-UML would also support United Nations (UN) monitors.

NHRC AND ELECTION COMMISSION NEED NEUTRAL MEMBERS

17. (C) On the recent resignations of the National Human Rights Commission and Election Commission members (ref D), MK Nepal said both institutions should be staffed by neutral, competent individuals, that were neither afraid of Maoist guns nor easily influenced by the GON. He saw little prospect of quick action by the GON to fill the posts.

COMMENT

18. (C) While MK Nepal seemed frustrated by the lack of unity and coordination among the SPA, the CPN-UML leader was also optimistic that the Maoists will ultimately disarm and join the political mainstream. MK Nepal offered scant factual basis for his conviction that the Maoists will ultimately lay down their arms, but was animated in expressing the conviction that disarmament is a precondition for peace and Nepal's democratic transition. We will continue to stress the importance of SPA unity in insisting on Maoist disarmament.

DEAN